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Abstract The present article discusses the concepts of having
a goal and of goal-directed behavior from a behavior-analytic
perspective. In clinical psychology as well as in the study of
human behavior at large, goals delineate an important area of
investigation when it comes to health, well-being, and behav-
ioral change. While concepts like goals and goal-directed
behavior may be more frequently used outside the theoretical
boundaries of behavior analysis, we argue that by incorporat-
ing recent behavior analytic research on verbal behavior, new
and fruitful ways open up for approaching the phenomenon of
having a goal. A behavior-analytic approach thereby may
increase both precision in understanding and the potential
for influencing essential aspects of human behavior. This
analysis starts with the concept of rule-governed behavior
and develops that analysis by using the concept of derived
relational responding.
Keywords Goals . Goal-directed behavior . Rule-governed
behavior . Relational frame theory
To “have a goal” is probably a universal experience in
language-able humans, and the custom of talking about one’s
goals is a commonplace behavior in everyday conversation.
Future goals tend to be ascribed significant value, on a per-
sonal basis, and goal-oriented behavior almost seems to de-
lineate the complexity of human responding in comparison
with that of other species. Clinicians who reside within a
behavioral tradition are trained to emphasize clear and tangi-
ble goals in treatment. This approach seems to make a lot of
sense to patients, students, and clinicians. Individuals are in a
sense impregnated with the idea that their personal goals are
pivotal in terms of forming a valuable life. From a theoretical
point of view, the concept of goals has also acquired a central
role in psychology as a means of explaining behavior. This
role dates back to the 1960s, when the dramatic shift toward
cognitive theories occurred and the concept of needs was
replaced by the concept of goals as a dominant motivational
concept (Deci and Ryan 2000).
At the same time, there is a relative paucity of behavior-
analytic accounts of goal-directed behavior. This situation
may not be very surprising in that goals (as humans tend to
perceive them) are temporarily located in a future yet to exist.
The commonsense term goal-directed behavior thereby seems
to defy experimental logic, where causes must precede the
behavior to be explained, and the term thereby runs into
problems within a psychological framework that stresses ex-
perimentally verified principles. Behavior analysis empha-
sizes clear variables that are amenable to deliberate influence
in order to pave the way for scientific progress in areas where
the language of folk psychology is dominant. Outside the
behavior-analytic tradition, the concept of goals is used ex-
tensively, and, as it seems, with good reason. The empirical
research that has emanated from the concept of goals does
seem to delineate something of vital importance to human
beings. Before we attempt to articulate a behavioral concep-
tualization of goal-directed behavior, we will go through some
of the research on goals of particular relevance for clinical
practice. In order to do that, we will momentarily set aside the
definitional issues and instead rely on the reader’s common-
sense understanding of the term goal, and then return to the
problems inherent in the commonsense notion of having a
goal.
An Overview of Empirical Findings on Goals
Goals as Related to Personal Functioning
A number of basic conceptual dimensions regarding goals
have been proposed and have generated interesting empirical
findings. A distinction often made is that between intrinsic and
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extrinsic goals (Kasser and Ryan 1993, 1996). Intrinsic goals
are those pertaining to affiliation, personal growth, and
community contribution, which are assumed to be closely
related to the satisfaction of what Kasser and Ryan referred
to as basic human needs, whereas extrinsic goals are those
concerning the attainment of wealth, fame, and factors more
related to external signs of worth. Extrinsic goals are as-
sumed to be less related to basic-need satisfaction and may
even distract from this process. The literature is replete with
studies stating that having clear and valued goals is related
to positive psychological functioning (e.g., Brunstein 1993;
Emmons 1992; Sheldon and Elliot 1999). What would be
labeled as an orientation toward extrinsic rather than intrin-
sic goals has been shown to be associated with increased
risk on variables such as the use of tobacco and drugs
(Williams et al. 2000). Furthermore, endorsement of extrin-
sic goals, in comparison with intrinsic goals, tends to be
correlated with depression, anxiety, and negative affect
among other variables (Kasser and Ryan 1993, 1996). Peo-
ple who report an extrinsic goal orientation also tend to
report having been raised with less nurturing child-raising
styles—that is, styles that are more controlling than sup-
portive (Kasser et al. 1995).
Another health-relevant goal dimension is whether goals
are approach or avoidance oriented. Candidates for psycho-
therapy have been found to be more oriented toward avoid-
ance goals than are normal controls, and intensity of orienta-
tion toward avoidance goals correlates with severity of psy-
chopathology, poor well-being, and other psychological prob-
lems in psychotherapy patients as well as in normal controls
(Grosse Holtforth and Grawe 2002). Cox and Klinger (2002)
approached what was seen as superordinate aspects of differ-
ent goal-related constructs in terms of structure, where an
adaptive goal structure is characterized by the person’s ability
to formulate approach goals that he or she is committed to,
where the fulfillment of these goals is emotionally rewarding,
and where he or she is optimistic regarding the possibility of
goal achievement.What was labeled a maladaptive goal struc-
ture lacks one or several of these aspects. Maladaptive goal
structure in combination with high perceived task difficulty
and stress has been found to be associated with depression
among students (Lecci et al. 1994).
In a clinical setting, Pöhlmann (as cited in Grosse Holtforth
and Grawe 2002) found that patients with psychosomatic
disorders tended to endorse a higher number of goals than
healthy controls did. However, the patients’ goals were dom-
inated by avoidance orientation and often formulated within a
narrow area of concern. Also, within a sample of patients
treated for anxiety disorders, stating conflicting personal goals
showed negative correlation with therapeutic behaviors such
as cooperation, openness, and readiness to try new behaviors
but were positively correlated to resistance and a tendency to
drop out (Michalak et al. 2004).
Goals as Related to Therapy and Behavior Change
Several important functions have been attributed to the con-
cept of goals within the area of psychological treatments. For
example, goals provide attentional focus for both client and
therapist and provide criteria for evaluation of progress. There
is also the possibility that the process of formulating goals
exerts a therapeutic effect in itself (Grosse Holtforth and
Castonguay 2005). It has, for instance, been found that clients’
rated satisfaction with assessment interviews was positively
correlated both with clarity of assessment and with the option
for participation in treatment planning. Interestingly, thera-
pists’ rated satisfaction did not correlate with these negotiable
variables (Eisenthal et al. 1983). Likewise, patients in psychi-
atric day care rated the treatment as more meaningful when
they perceived the goals as clearly specified (Goldstein et al.
1988). Furthermore, in a study where quality of therapy was
judged by independent assessors, one element that was found
to be associated with what was perceived as “good therapy”
was when the goals of the treatment were explicitly addressed
by the client and the therapist (Hoyt 1980).
Tryon and Winograd (2002) published a review of studies
on the impact on treatment outcome from two goal-related
aspects in psychotherapy: goal consensus, which is to what
degree there is a mutual agreement between the therapist and
the client on the goals for therapy, and goal collaboration,
which is to what degree the therapist and the client work
conjointly with the goals for therapy. Tryon and Winograd
identified 24 studies with relevance for assessing the impact of
goal collaboration on treatment outcome and found consider-
able support for a relationship between these two variables.
On goal consensus, they identified 17 studies generally favor-
ing a positive relationship between this aspect and outcome,
but to a lesser degree. In a subsequent meta- analysis on the
subject, they included studies published from 2000 through
2009 (Tryon and Winograd 2011). Here, they identified 15
studies with a total sample size of 1,302 that yielded a goal
consensus–psychotherapy outcome effect size of r=.34, a
medium effect size, indicating that better outcomes can be
expected when there is a consensus between patient and
therapist regarding therapeutic goals and the processes to
achieve these goals. When turning to the factor of goal col-
laboration, Tryon and Winograd identified 19 studies with a
total sample of 2,260 patients that yielded a mean correlation
of r=.33, indicating that psychotherapy outcome is enhanced
when patient and therapist are actively involved in a collabo-
rative effort to formulate goals for treatment.
The idea of the beneficial effects of formulating goals has
also gained support from other areas of behavioral change.
One study indicated that writing about life goals may be
associated with health benefits, very much in the same vein
as expressive writing about one’s past has been (King 2001).
In student settings, goal pursuit has been positively associated
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with value endorsement, behavioral persistence, conceptual
understanding, and personal adjustment, which in turn make a
difference with regard to educational outcomes (Deci and
Ryan 2000). When it comes to influencing human behavior,
organizational and industrial psychology represents the area
where the effects of goal setting has been most widely
researched and where goal setting has been most consistently
shown to have an effect on productivity outcome (Locke and
Latham 2002). To summarize this brief overview on empirical
studies, we can quite confidently state that there is an indica-
tion that the issue of personal goals and formulation of goals
denotes an area of vital concern for human functioning and is
of instrumental value in the process of influencing human
behavior.
The Definition of Goal as a Concept
The Cognitive Position
Elliot and Fryer (2008) pointed to the ubiquity of goal-related
constructs in psychology from both a theoretical and an em-
pirical point of view. Despite ample use of the term goal, they
noted that both researchers and theorists have neglected to
offer a definition of the term and that it tends to be used as a
rather vague concept where its meaning is taken for granted.
Elliot and Fryer also stated that this lack of clarity is a grave
concern, since it hinders progress in empirical research. A
consensual definition was not to be found, but they drew some
defining features of what is meant by a goal from the
literature:
A goal is a cognitive representation of a future object
that the organism is committed to approach or avoid. . . .
A goal is focused on the future; it is a cognitive repre-
sentation of something that is possible in the future.
Goal-directed behavior is proactive, not reactive. It en-
tails use of a future image as a guide to present behavior;
it does not simply entail an immediate, unmediated
response to a present stimulus . . . . Implicit in this
conceptualization is that the mental image of the future
possibility has a causal influence on present behavior.
(Elliot and Fryer 2008, p. 245)
The aforementioned definition is very much in line with an
earlier definition by Brunstein et al. (1998): “Personal goals
are elaborate cognitive representations of what a person wants
to achieve or avoid in his or her current life circumstances” (p.
494). In these definitions of the goal concept, a central tenet is
the mental representation of a desired future outcome. These
definitions might be unproblematic from a commonsense
point of view. But when a definition rests upon another term,
cognitive representation, this term needs to be defined tomake
sense of the first term. Trying to define the term mental
representation, researchers run into a similar problem: the
lack of a generally agreed definition. If they were to go along
with Gallistel (2001), they could adopt the definition of a
mental representation as “a system of symbols isomorphic to
some aspects of the environment, used to make behavior-
generating decisions that anticipate events and relations in
that environment” (p. 9691). According to Tye (2000), repre-
sentationalism appeals to the transparency of experience. The
properties in a perceptual experience are presented as proper-
ties of objects perceived; they are not presented as mere
properties of the experience itself. Thus, according to the
representationalist view, the phenomenal character of an ex-
perience is due to its representing objective, nonexperiential
properties. Thus, following this line of reasoning, goals are
conceptualized as mental events that represent properties of
the future, and these events can be considered to have causal
influence on behavior.
The Behavior-Analytic Position
In the behavior-analytic literature, references to goals or goal-
directed behavior are less common. This should come as no
surprise, since these concepts, in a dualist fashion, tend to rest
upon hypothetical mental entities that are used for causal
explanation of the individual’s behavior, a form of reasoning
that is at odds with behavior-analytic thinking. However, the
concept of goals is used in the literature in ways that imply that
goals do have some bearing on the behavior of the behavior
analysts themselves. For example, in the classic article by
Baer et al. (1968), reference is made to the researcher’s goal.
In the same vein, Wolf (1978) raised the question of the social
significance of the specific behavioral goals that govern the
applied work. Likewise, in the applied behavior analysis
literature, goals are used as a concept that describes what
regulates behavioral change programs (e.g., Cooper et al.
2007), and lately references have been made to the goals of
contextual behavioral science as such (Hayes et al. 2012).
A notable exception within the behavior-analytic field is
the organizational behavioral management (OBM) literature,
where goals are frequently addressed, especially in terms of
methodology. Different procedures of goal setting are de-
scribed as a widely used and well-established method for
increasing productivity (Tammemagi et al. 2013) and are often
employed in combination with feedback procedures (Alvero
et al. 2001). But in texts that deal directly with the basic
behavioral terminology of goals, a picture much more colored
by critical voices emerges.
Skinner (1985, 1989) stated that while words suggesting
probable action seem to point to the future, they are in fact
referring to past consequences. Intention is mainly a way to
speak of operant behavior, and operant behavior is shaped by
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the histories of the subjects. The same goes for statements that
human behavior is directed toward goals and the satisfaction
of needs. These statements would translate into behavioral
terms by saying that people behave in ways that have had
reinforcing consequences in the past, and that these conse-
quences have been made reinforcing through natural selection
or operant conditioning.
There is no current goal, incentive, purpose or meaning
to be taken into account. This is so even if we ask him
what he is doing and he says, “I am looking for my
glasses.” This is not a further description of his behavior
but of the variables of which his behavior is a function; it
is equivalent to “I have lost my glasses, I shall stop what
I am doing when I find my glasses,” or “when I have
done this in the past, I have found my glasses.” These
translations may seem unnecessarily roundabout, but
only because expressions involving goals and purposes
are abbreviations. (Skinner 1953, p. 90)
This passage delineates two functions for behavior when
talking about goals. One is that goals can be used as abbrevi-
ations, pointing out the past reinforcing consequences of
behavior in a person’s environment; the other is that goals
denote a consequence specified in advance that will terminate
the behavioral event in question.
This way of talking about goals is quite in accordance with
the analysis made by Baum (2005). In his words, the goals of
an activity can be referred to as part of that activity. Goals are a
quality of behavior rather than causes of behavior. For in-
stance, in an individual’s behavior of walking toward the city
center, the goal of walking (a specific location) is inseparable
from the activity of walking. Walking to the beach would, in a
functional sense, not be the same behavior with another goal.
It would be a different behavior. This logic will inevitably
make the same contingencies responsible for the goal as for
the “goal-directed behavior,” since they are mere topograph-
ical aspects of the same behavioral entity.
On a more applied level, Fellner and Sulzer-Azaroff (1984)
discussed goals and goal setting in an OBM context. They
provided a general definition of goal setting as an established
efficacious method for behavioral influence that specifies a
level of performance toward which the person should work. In
their account, goals are defined in terms of functional proper-
ties, and a goal will be seen as a stimulus that precedes
behavior. When a verbal event—that is, a goal statement—
reliably accompanies a reinforced response, this verbal event
may acquire the property of a discriminative stimulus. There-
by, when uttered, this verbal statement will increase the prob-
ability of that response being emitted. By definition, this will
mean that in the presence of such a goal statement, actual
reinforcement is more likely, and in absence of that statement,
it is less so. Furthermore, in their account they hypothesized
that goal attainment may acquire the function of a conditioned
reinforcer if goal attainment reliably accompanies the rein-
forcers that follow upon the actual behavior. From a common-
sense perspective, the behavior-analytic conceptions of goals
may seem like an odd entry, since the more usual way is to
treat the goals of behavior as events that are separate from
these behaviors and as events that are located in the future
rather than in the history. The behavior-analytic conception,
thereby, may pose problemswith regard to the everyday use of
the concept of goals.
While Fellner and Sulzer-Azaroff’s (1984) account may be
satisfying the behavior-analytic task of making the processes
studied accessible to experimental manipulation, it principally
contains the possibility of substituting the goal statement with
a random word, and the goal attainment with a token. Our
assumption is that few would refer to the resulting behavior as
goal directed. It is also hard to see how this use of the term
goal would be helpful, even in the community of behavior
analysts themselves when using the term in reference to their
own enterprise. And what are behavior analysts to do with
goals that are formulated about events that have no obvious
counterpart in the individual’s experienced history—goals
such as “world peace”? What are behavior analysts to do with
verbally stated goals that are not a part of behavior that is
directed at or under the control of the goals in question? After
all, it is obvious that an individual can talk about walking
toward the city center without acting accordingly, and thereby
“failing to reach the goal.” Or if the individual’s goal is to
reach the city center by foot, there may be several options for
different behaviors that would be functionally equivalent in
the sense that they would all make the individual end up at the
same place. Yet, these options may differ in the efficiency of
producing that outcome. There is even a possibility of talking
about goals and behaving in a fashion that reasonably would
be considered counterproductive to achieving those goals. It is
easy to find objections to the behavior analytic passages
above, since they seem to be incompatible with the usefulness
of these words in everyday conversation.
At the same time, while these behavior-analytic ideas may
defy the commonsense notion of a goal, they put a healthy
focus on the task at hand, which is to formulate what seems to
be a part of the subject’s future as a part of his or her learning
history.
Goals as Mental Representations
Representational conceptualizations of goals, on the other
hand, seem to run smoothly with the everyday use of the term.
When speaking of goals, the idea of a mental image of
something that a human being wants almost seems like a
perfect match with common sense. Individuals picture their
lives in the future in a different, but more desired, state than
today. These images may be expressed as verbal descriptions,
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and we will call these descriptions “goals.” Individuals are
able to execute functional behavior in striving toward these
goals, as long as the goals are deemed to be realistic.
But the problem pointed out by Elliot and Fryer (2008) is
one of vagueness and lack of precision, which is a grave
concern in scientific affairs. The problem is not its usefulness
in everyday language, which in contrast seems rather unprob-
lematic. As stated previously, the proposition was to treat goals
as mental representations of the future events that can be
considered causes of behavior.Wewill set aside all problematic
aspects of the term mental, since this discussion is outside the
scope of the present article. Even if one would accept the basic
tenets of representationalism, according to Tye (2000), there
will be a logical fallacy when treating goals as representations
of future events. The future by definition has no objective
features. It is no property of the external environment. If goals
are representations, what do they re-present?
This would also mean that there is a basic problemwith how
goals, as representations, reasonably could be measured by
standards of truth, realism, and correspondence to a world
outside a mind. Further, it often stated both in commonsense
reasoning and in the literature that it is desirable to set realistic
goals (e.g., Cox and Klinger 2002). This would imply that one
should avoid goals that are deemed to be unrealistic. But this
distinction will also run into problems within a representational
account. What are the real-world properties these goals could
be judged against? They can form no part of the future but only
be a part of the past or present. And unrealistic goals that have
no correspondence in the history of man (e.g., “world peace”),
and sadly no realistic outlook of being achieved in a foreseeable
future, may yet inspire people to do greats deeds. These could
be deeds that would be valuable to the person and to other
human beings, in spite of not ultimately terminating warfare.
On a less global scale, it is easy to imagine similar scenarios
regarding health-related goals on an individual basis (“live ’til I
get hundred”). It is hard to fit goals into the representationalist
view, since there is no possibility to determine what the goals
are re-presentations of. Etymologically, the prefix re carries
with it the meaning of “again,” which makes sense to the idea
of re-presenting the past. Future goals should, if anything,
rather be pre-presentations.
A Behavior-Analytic Account of Goal-Directed Behavior
The Task for Behavior Analysis When It Comes
to the Concept of Goals
The first question before we continue to delineate a behavior-
analytic account of what it means to have a goal is why we
should do it. As pointed out by Moore (2001), there is a
challenge for behavioral theorists to make sense of
psychological terms that appeal to the mental. When
attempting to understand the usage of a term such as goals,
one needs to look closer at verbal behavior. And to deepen that
analysis, one needs to understand multiple controls of verbal
behavior. As Moore stated, one can assume that this behavior
is controlled (a) partly by sociocultural traditions and (b)
partly by operations and contact with other aspects of the
environment. People will talk about goals because a verbal
community has reinforced this behavior, but also because this
verbal behavior has been functional with regard to actions the
person has taken in a particular context. Terms such as goals
may be perfectly reasonable as descriptive terms relating to
the probability of a response. Or as put by Foxall (2004): “The
testimony that people give us about their intentions, plans,
hopes, worries, thoughts and feelings is by far the most
important source of information we have about them” (p.
112).
The research cited earlier indicates that the verbal behavior
referred to as goal statements may be useful for the purpose of
both predicting and influencing behavior. And as already
indicated, behavior analysts use the term goals in a way that
hints that they themselves also seem to have goals and find use
in formulating them. The analytic approach of behavior anal-
ysis is fundamentally practical. In this vein, when Fellner and
Sulzer-Azaroff (1984) pointed to the behavior-analytic objec-
tive in avoiding mentalist conceptions, this practical ambition
corresponds in an OBM context to the search for concepts that
has a value in guiding managers and administrators toward the
environmental conditions that may be influenced. Rather that,
than attempting to influence inaccessible mental processes in
employees.
Goal-Directed Behavior as Rule Governed
A reasonable way to study goals would be to ask people about
them in one way or another. Essentially, that is how the
empirical data on goals, cited previously, have been collected.
The fact that goal-setting procedures tend to be stressed in the
OBM literature and in clinical literature should be considered
from the perspective that both areas primarily deal with ver-
bally competent individuals. In these areas, both the behavior
under scrutiny and the influence it is exposed to are often
verbal. So, in order to provide further precision in the analysis,
the events under study are considered to be verbal re-
sponses—that is, goal statements—rather than goals per se
(O’Hora and Maglieri 2006).
To follow Skinner in an analysis, goal statements are a form
of human behavior that may in turn influence other behavior.
Talking about goals is one functional class of behavior, and
behavior under the influence of such talking is another func-
tional class. When focusing on what effects goals have on
human behavior overall, what should be analyzed is not a goal
as an object but the relationship between these two functional
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classes of human behavior. It is thus a behavior–behavior
relationship (Hayes and Brownstein 1986; Leigland 2014).
If a person states a goal and then acts to achieve it, he or she is
interacting with his or her own behavior in the moment, not
with a future object.
Describing future goals in the present as related to events
that are hitherto not directly experienced touches on Skinner’s
(1966) analysis of rule-governed behavior. Skinner did not use
this term with regard to goals, but it is easy to see its relevance
for our subject area. A rule that influences subsequent behav-
ior is, according to Skinner, an antecedent specifying behavior
and consequence. The idea of treating goals as rules or state-
ments specifying contingencies, along with treating them as
motivating operations rather than as discriminative stimuli,
has by and large been adopted by the OBM literature (Agnew
and Redmon 1993; Malott 1993).
An example would be a man looking for his glasses in an
entirely new way and place upon hearing “Dig into the pot of
mashed potatoes and you will find your glasses!”Or, to use an
example of more complex behavior, “Join us in the demon-
stration next Saturday, and you will make a contribution to
world peace!” If someone then takes part in the demonstration
to achieve this end, it would be a case of rule-governed
behavior. It is also quite reasonable to expect that within a
cognitive framework, this behavior would be called “goal
driven,” where the goal that drives the behavior would be
conceptualized as a mental image of future possibilities. But in
Skinner’s analysis, this goal is neither mental nor future. It is
behavior under the control of the past and present context of
the listener to the rule.
We argue that it is quite possible to make a sensible and
parsimonious statement regarding goal-directed behavior
from a behavior-analytic position. Goal-directed behavior is
behavior under the influence of other behavior—that is, verbal
behavior or, more specifically, goal statements. In the simple
case, the establishing of a rule or instruction is overt verbal
behavior. But it may equally well be covert. The problem with
this position, when it comes to the concept of goal-directed
behavior, is not at the basic conceptual level. The problem is
what Skinner left unanswered: the question of how this verbal
behavior can influence other behavior.
A Relational Frame Theory Account of Goal-Directed
Behavior
In order to further the understanding of the behavioral pro-
cesses underlying goal-directed behavior, O’Hora and
Maglieri (2006) extended the analysis by incorporating prin-
ciples from relational frame theory (RFT; Hayes et al. 2001;
Törneke 2010). The rationale for this extension is twofold: It
should enable increased precision, and it should rest upon
basic behavioral principles amenable to empirical investiga-
tion. But O’Hora and Maglieri also noted that while
behavioral conceptualizations of goal setting have attempted
to account for putative behavioral histories, they have ignored
much of the empirical research on the effects of goals and goal
setting that is described in the cognitive literature. These
effects must be accounted for in a comprehensive behavioral
conceptualization of goal-directed behavior.
From an RFT perspective, it is suggested that verbal be-
havior is a special way of responding to relations between
stimuli (Törneke 2010). By means of operant learning,
humans acquire this ability to respond to socially established
contingencies early on (Healy et al. 1998; O’Hora et al. 2004).
Technically, this ability is called “arbitrary applicable relation-
al responding” or, more metaphorically, “relational framing.”
It is arbitrary in the sense that humans learn to relate events
based on arbitrary contextual cues rather than just on their
physical characteristics (Hayes et al. 2001). In RFT, the anal-
ysis of thinking follows that of Skinner in treating thinking as
private verbal behavior under contextual control. Thus, pri-
vate behavior can acquire functions as a result of the individ-
ual’s way of relating events to each other rather than purely on
that individual’s direct experience of these events.
Different ways of relating under contextual control have
been theoretically identified and experimentally verified. This
research has covered relations of coordination—that is, relat-
ing one event as the same as or equivalent to another relations
of opposition (Barnes-Holmes et al. 2004a; Carpentier et al.
2003; Dymond et al. 2008; Roche and Barnes 1997)—as well
as comparative relations—that is, relating events as more-than
or less-than (Barnes-Holmes et al. 2004c; Berens and Hayes
2007; Dymond and Barnes 1995; Munnelly et al. 2010). Other
types of relations are temporal relations (O’Hora et al. 2008),
causal relations (Dack et al. 2009), and hierarchical rela-
tions—that is, responding to one event as belonging to anoth-
er, or being part of or being included in another category of
events (Gil et al. 2012). Yet another type of framing is the
ability to take a certain perspective, or deictic relations
(McHugh et al. 2004; Weil et al. 2011).
These relations, established by arbitrary contextual cues,
alter the way events or stimuli acquire functions for further
behavior. Among the functions that have been studied exper-
imentally are respondent conditioning (Dougher et al. 1994,
2007), mood (Barnes-Holmes et al. 2004b; Cahill et al. 2010),
and evaluative conditioning effect (Valdivia-Salas et al. 2013).
These functions imply that if one is capable of interacting with
arbitrary contextual cues in a way that transforms stimulus
function, words or gestures may provide cues that can alter the
functions of stimuli. These stimuli thereby acquire new
“meaning.” The statement that “X is better than Y” contains
the word “better” (cuing comparative framing), which may
transform the valence of a not-yet-experienced event. Simple
examples of comparative framing would be the statements
“Japanese whisky is better than Scottish,” “German cars are
better than French ones,” and “Corn-fed chickens are better
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than ordinary ones.” Given that the listener has experienced
drinking Scottish whisky, driving French cars, and eating
ordinary chicken, he or she may now relate to Japanese
whisky, German cars, and corn-fed chicken as more appeti-
tive, without any direct contact with these stimuli. These
processes may be accomplished as a result of the listener
having the repertoire of interacting with arbitrary contextual
cues in a way that transforms the stimulus functions of present
events. These repertoires can be shaped, under contextual
control, to increasing complexity (Barnes-Holmes et al.
2004a; Lipkens and Hayes 2009). Once the basic repertoire
is available, quite complex actions can take place.
Goals as Relationally Framed Events
For the present discussion on goal-directed behavior, temporal
framing is of special importance. All organisms have the
ability to interact with changes in the environment. But once
the stimulus functions of the environment transform as a result
of arbitrary contextual cues, a new route to behavioral change
is established. Just as stimuli can be acted upon as “better”
without any direct experience, they can be acted upon as
“coming later” without any prior experience of the stimuli or
the events occurring in this specific order. So, through the
processes described, a person will be able to interact with
verbal stimuli so that he or she will constitute a rule in the
form “If you do Z, youmay acquire X, which is better than Y.”
If the rule influences the following behavior, the result is what
is typically called “rule-governed behavior.” In this way, RFT
offers an analysis of how a rule can specify behavior and
consequence, to use Skinner’s (1966) words.
O’Hora and Maglieri (2006) have incorporated the concep-
tual framework of RFT in the analysis of goal statements as a
means of understanding the process of influencing behavior in
an organizational context. They pointed out a limitation in the
behavioral literature, when it often neglects empirical findings
from other areas in the field and may fail to offer an account of
these findings. Specifically, they pointed out that research
unanimously shows that when goal difficulty increases, perfor-
mance improves, regardless of whether the goal is attained or
not. These results run counter to the idea of goal statements as
discriminative stimuli. Increased difficulty would reasonably be
associated with less likelihood of reinforcers to occur (i.e., goal
attainment), and performance should be expected to decrease.
But O’Hora and Maglieri argued that effective goal state-
ments function by specifying a level of performance that will
relate feedback statements over ongoing performance, in a
“more/less-than” frame, to the behavior defined by the goal.
If the goal is to complete 10 activities, stating that one has
completed three activities rather than none relates the ongoing
performance to the goal statement. The approaching of the
defined goal level is only achieved indirectly, by verbal means,
but will allow for the reinforcement of “being on the right way.”
Thus, reinforcement is quite possible, even though the goal in
itself is not attained. In this way, the behavior in question
acquires derived reinforcing functions through a verbal state-
ment signaling closer proximity toward an event or state not yet
reached. But in order for this function to persist over time, the
relation between the goal level of performance and the rein-
forcement inherent in attaining the goal needs to be maintained,
to retain the reinforcing effects of verbal feedback. Behaviors
that are task-relevant will be more likely to occur and those that
are task-irrelevant will be less likely, when goal and feedback
statements are provided. O’Hora and Maglieri (2006) also
touched upon a more process-related feature of goal setting in
production facilities when relations are derived “based on the
deictic (I-You) relations between each employee’s view of him
or herself and his or her view of other employees (e.g., ‘We’re
all in the same boat’)” (p. 154). In this way, RFTcan be used in
an analysis of goal-directed behavior as behavior under the
influence of other behavior and to analyze how antecedent
and consequential functions of events change owing to derived
relational responding.
Implications of a Behavior-Analytic Account
of Goal-Directed Behavior
It is easy to agree with the previously mentioned point made
by Elliot and Fryer (2008) that lack of generally agreed
concepts is an obstacle for scientific progress in a field. The
concept of goals as a determinant of human behavior repre-
sents such a field. The traditional way to conceptualize goals,
as mental representations that govern behavior, is so well
established that approximations of this view can be used with
ease in everyday conversation. We have argued that treating
goals as mental entities is unpractical when searching for a
more precise formulation. Despite the relative paucity of a
theoretical elaboration of the goal concept within earlier
behavior-analytic thinking, we find it quite possible to make
a sensible definition of goal-directed behavior from this posi-
tion. RFTmay serve as a basis for such a definition, and it may
also be used to provide increased precision in an analysis of
goal concepts. So, to summarize our position, we treat goal-
directed behavior as behavior under the influence of other
behavior—that is, verbal behavior, or rather, the more specific
instance of goal statements. Goal statements will function as
rules—in other words, antecedents specifying behavior and
consequence. These functional relationships are under the
control of the past and present context of the listener to the
rule, and they may be analyzed in terms of how antecedent
and consequential functions of events change as a result of
derived relational responding. The latter will be especially
applicable when goal statements denote consequences that
have not been directly contacted.
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A behavior-analytic approach should also be practical. In
the present paper, we focus on the impact of goals for vari-
ables concerning health or quality of life and the goal-
formulating process that is part of therapeutic work. Needless
to say, the practical usefulness of goal concepts should be of
central importance in these areas.
Goal Statements Predict Well-Being
As we have concluded earlier, endorsing certain types of goal
statements correlates with health and well-being (e.g.,
Brunstein 1993; Kasser and Ryan 1993, 1996; Williams et al.
2000). This correlation could reflect a simple relationship be-
tween certain goal statements and behavior that ultimately
increases the likelihood of contacting the reinforcers specified
in a rule. Some goal statements are more likely to be associated
with behavior that leads to well-being. But apart from the
discriminative functions of this kind of verbal behavior, goal
statements will also establish derived functions that are poten-
tially appetitive (or aversive). These functions are contacted by
framing events using comparative, temporal, and causal frames
(“If I do X now, I will be in a better position to attain Y later”).
In the appropriate context, this framing can be done with-
out any direct contact or experience with the events in ques-
tion. The so-called future is verbal behavior in the present, and
different stimulus functions are established by relational
framing. From a phenomenal point of view, it should be
noted that by using the concept verbal behavior, we by no
means argue that the apparent future is necessarily perceived
as constructed by words only. Images may also be an
important part of the experience. It is as if the individual can
see the future, in the same sense described by Skinner (1953)
as seeing “stimuli which are not present” (p. 266). In this case,
it would be seeing under the control of derived relations
between events. It is quite reasonable that in some instances
just formulating future goals can affect individuals’ emotional
state and thus make them feel better (King 2001), just as
thinking about the future can make them feel bad.
A similar analysis will clarify why a predominance of
avoidance goals tends to be associated with increased indices
of psychopathology (Grosse Holtforth and Grawe 2002). If
the behavior of making goal statements is under a predomi-
nantly aversive control (“If I do X when Y, I may avoid the
aversive Z later”), that verbal behavior will increase indirect
contact with the aversive event to be avoided—for example,
anxiety. In this situation, these goal statements will relate a
multitude of events in the ongoing environment to the even-
tuality of experiencing anxiety and thereby potentially in-
crease the perceived aversiveness of that environment, a pro-
cess that may ultimately fuel anxiety. So, apart from the
possibility that goal statements may be instrumental in behav-
ior–behavior relationships, where the latter behavior ultimate-
ly steers the individual to good or bad health, they may set the
individual in emotional contact with appetitive or aversive
aspects of the world through the derived functions of this
world. This process could be considered an important aspect
of the motivative functions of goal statements.
Life Goals
The importance of successful goal-directed behavior could, of
course, be equated with behaviors that ultimately lead to
consequences verbally specified in advance. But this effect
does not necessarily imply that this instance is the only one
where behavior analysts are able to identify the beneficial
effects of goal statements. A question that becomes critical
when it comes to the term unrealistic goals. A behavior
analytic account does not rest upon representational, realist
assumptions, and therefore the usefulness of goal statements
will not be dependent on an assumed correspondence between
the content in the goal statements and a world different from
where these statements were made.
We could treat goal-talk as any behavior—in other words, as
having the potential to serve a multitude of functions. This
means that goal statements may be adaptive or maladaptive in
promoting health-related activities or behaviors that are impor-
tant to the community, regardless of these behaviors not nec-
essarily guaranteeing an outcome such as old age or world
peace. In approaching goal-directed behavior as a behavior–
behavior relationship, behavior analysts cannot make any a
priori assumption that one behavior (goal-talk) influences the
other behavior. This question will always be an empirical one.
From a behavior analytic point of view, the distinction between
goals as intrinsic or extrinsic (Kasser and Ryan 1993, 1996)
may not be very meaningful in itself. Actually, this discussion
parallels the discussion of intrinsic or extrinsic reinforcers,
where some researchers have promulgated the former ones as
superior in many ways, while the basis for making this distinc-
tion has been severely criticized by others (Dickinson 1989).
Goal statements falling in the two descriptive categories of
intrinsic and extrinsic could simply be seen as reflecting differ-
ent categories of potentially reinforcing properties of the envi-
ronment, as well as rules how to contact these reinforcers.
The relation between the level of performance defined by
the goal statement and external reinforcement should be main-
tained in order for the derived reinforcing effects of verbal
feedback to function over time. In goals referred to as intrinsic,
it would probably be harder to uphold the reinforcing relation
contained within a less-than frame, in the way described by
O’Hora and Maglieri (2006). But it would be reasonable to
expect such a goal orientation to be associated with behaviors
that may contact a wide range of reinforcers pertaining to
affiliation, well-being, and community contribution—that is,
predominantly social reinforcers. If theorists are speaking in
terms of rule-governed behavior, this phenomena would be
considered in terms of augmentals (Törneke 2010). An
96 Psychol Rec (2015) 65:89–99
augmental is a rule that affects the degree to which different
consequences function as reinforcing or punishing. It can also
be described as a form of verbal establishing or motivating
operation. These goals may serve important functions, irrespec-
tive of whether the state described in the goal statement will be
reached. It may be worthwhile striving for old age and peace,
even if the person may not live long or warfare not terminated.
The Incremental Effects of Goal Statements in Clinical Work
Collaboration and consensus over treatment goals have been
found to have beneficial effects in clinical work (Tryon and
Winograd 2002, 2011). This finding fits well with the preceding
analysis, as goal statements affect to what extent consequences
will function as reinforcers of the behavior in question—or put
differently, how goal statements may augment functions of
directly contacted consequences. For example, the goal of
exposure-based treatment may be formulated as the ability to
live a more independent life, less controlled by anxiety. Steps
taken in the treatment and their consequences may now be
framed in hierarchy with this ultimate treatment goal and there-
by be reinforcing, even though the individual’s life might still
be largely a dependent one and controlled by anxiety.
Goal statements may provide stimulus functions that re-
duce the likelihood of off-task and counterproductive behav-
ior (O’Hora and Maglieri 2006). In treatment, formulating
goals could imply lessening the appetitive features of various
types of avoidant behaviors, just by pointing out the incom-
patibility between these strategies and the chosen goals.When
a goal is defined not as a mental entity but as verbal behavior,
it is conceptualized as a variable that readily lends itself to
manipulation. This kind of manipulation is what clinicians
would do in verbal therapy when engaging in goal collabora-
tion. The beneficial effects of goal-talk in therapy could be
understood as a mutual process, where two (or more) persons
bring their behavior under the control of shared verbal behav-
ior—that is, goal statements.
Goal-talk may not only serve a useful purpose in orienting
mutual future behavior in a way that is more likely to reach the
consequences specified, but also promote a sense of commu-
nion between those involved. It may foster cohesion in ther-
apeutic work and ultimately be instrumental in creating a
working alliance beyond specifying outcome or outcome
domain. Sharing goals will allow for an experience of “we-
ness” based on a deictic (I-You) frame, thereby establishing
one’s role with regard to the other (Vilardaga and Hayes
2010). The process of establishing and maintaining a thera-
peutic alliance is considered pivotal in therapy, and agreement
on goals is an important part of this working alliance (Horvath
et al. 2011). It is reasonable to expect the mutual formulation
process to be associated with perceived therapeutic qualities.
As stated earlier, goal collaboration and agreement tend to
have a general positive correlation with outcome. One aspect of
this correlation is probably that reinforcers specified by rules
are more effectively attained when the process of formulating
goal statements is emphasized. Another aspect may equally
well be in terms of the therapeutic relationship. Goal statements
made by clients provide abbreviations of their behavioral his-
tories (Skinner 1953). Attending to these goals will be attend-
ing to the client as a historical being and thereby contributing to
a process beneficial for the therapeutic alliance.
Another common therapeutic situation is work with clients
showing deficiencies in their capability for goal-directed be-
havior more generally. Based on RFT, the present conceptu-
alization offers a number of entries for analyzing and training
the core behavioral processes that constitute complex behav-
ior, similar to those exemplified elsewhere (Rehfeldt and
Barnes-Holmes 2009). This kind of training could include
training a person in specific relational repertoires such as, for
example, temporal, deictic, and hierarchical frames. Ultimate-
ly, this training would focus on rule-governed behavior and
especially the form called tracking (Törneke 2010).
If goal-directed behavior is conceptualized as behavior un-
der the influence of verbal behavior, defined as relational
framing, we see no hindrance for the empirical findings cited
earlier in this article to be assimilatedwithin a behavior-analytic
model. This line of thought has potential for analyzing goal-
directed behavior without falling prey to concepts that are not
readily amenable to either observation or deliberate influence.
RFT offers a conceptual account in which goals and the prob-
lem of pre-presenting the future in a parsimonious way can be
linked to a conceptual apparatus and psychological processes
that readily lend themselves to empirical investigation. As
argued previously, the experimental work within the RFT
tradition offers a fruitful basis for investigating the processes
that constitute the capacity for formulating goal statements and
orienting one’s behavior in accordance with these statements.
The goals for that analysis should be increased precision and an
opening for new ways to understand and influence behavior.
The way to go there is to consider goals not as mental but as
environmental events. Goals are a type of behavior that occurs
in the same environment as other behavior.
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